The Dual Policy in the Dual Economy - The Political Economy of Urban Bias in Dictatorial Regimes by Shifa, Abdulaziz
The dual policy in the dual economy - the political




One of the most common policy obstacles in the global eﬀort against
poverty is what is termed as “urban bias” where rural residents, who con-
stitute majority of the poor in the world, face systematic bias against their
economic interests by their own governments. This paper develops a simple
political economy model of urban bias in dictatorial regimes. Equilibrium out-
comes relating policy outcomes with economic structure, political power, and
other behavioral and structural variables are analyzed. The model shows that
anti-agricultural biases can emerge in primarily agrarian societies even if there
is no bias in political power between urban and rural citizens. Evidence from
recent World Bank country level panel data on biases against/for agriculture
provides support for the model’s prediction.
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1 Introduction
One of the major policy features that characterized many poor states is a heavy
bias against the rural population. This bias stands out as one of the most important
policy obstacles to poverty reduction as vast majority of the poorest households
depend on farming for their livelihood. According to the Rural Poverty Report 2011,
“1.4 billion people continue to live in extreme poverty, struggling to survive on less
than US $1:25 a day. More than two thirds of them reside in rural areas of developing
countries.” The bias was ﬁrst articulated by Lipton and he coined the term “urban
bias” in 1977 with his inﬂuential book Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in
World Development [Lipton, 1977]. Lipton identiﬁed such systematic bias against
rural residents as the single most important source of deprivation for majority of
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1the poor across the world. Bates (1984) latter documented cases of systematic anti-
peasant policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bates (1984) particularly provided extensive
accounts of various tax instruments such as government-owned marketing boards
with monopsony power to buy export products from peasants at administratively
set low prices. Governments then sell those products at the prevailing world prices
and pocket the surplus. Bates (1984) also show how governments in Sub-Saharan
Africa manipulated exchange rates against exportable farm products and used other
domestic policies to suppress prices of agricultural products (particularly food) in
the domestic market. More recently, Bezemer and Headey (2008) single out urban
bias as “the largest institutional impediment to growth and poverty reduction in
the worlds poorest countries.” This paper attempts to provide both an empirical
and theoretical contribution to better understand the underlying political economy
mechanisms driving the bias.
A formal political economy model is developed to explain urban bias. Main
feature of the model is the focus on dictatorial regimes. The focus on non-democratic
polity is a novelty of this model since both the empirical analysis in this paper and
previous case studies of urban bias typically show that urban bias is primarily a
feature of non-democratic regimes. Particular attention is given to the political
environment so as to capture the main regime features that characterize a typical
dictatorial regime. One of those features of dictatorial regimes is the role of intra-
elite conﬂict in power transfer. In many dictatorial regimes, conﬂicts within the
ruling elite are major sources of threat to political power. A usual source of such
threats is coup d’etat. Citizens may also play a role in those conﬂicts. For example,
citizens can support certain factions within the ruling circle. On the other hand,
regime insiders may use popular sentiments against the current leader to come to
power. It is not unusual for regime insiders to capitalize on citizens dissatisfaction
to justify coup d’etat against a leader. The model combines these features where
regime insiders and citizens may have role to inﬂuence policies and force leader’s
overthrow. Equilibrium outcomes relating policy outcomes with economic structure,
political power, and other behavioral and structural variables are analyzed.
The model provides testable predictions regarding political incentives and eco-
nomic structure as deﬁned by the relative size of diﬀerent sectors in the economy.
To test the main prediction of the model that relates to the link between policy
bias (toward/against agriculture) and sectoral composition in dictatorial regimes,
I have made use of the recent country level panel data set compiled by a team of
researchers (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) measuring assistances (or taxes) to
agricultural products and political institutions variables. The data suggests that
the empirical evidence is consistent with the model’s prediction.
This paper attempts to narrow the gap in the large literature on urban bias
and agricultural policies that began with observing what appears to be a general
pattern that poor countries tax agriculture while rich countries subsidize. Among
the early works to notice this pattern are Bale and Lutz (1981), Honma and Hayami
(1986), and Krueger et al. (1988). A large part of the early literature thus tries to
ﬁnd out diﬀerences in economic structure between the two groups of countries (i.e.
“developed” versus “developing”) that can possibly aﬀect agricultural policies. The
problem with this approach is that countries that diﬀer in their economic structure
2also tend to diﬀer in political structure. Bates and Rogerson (1980), for example,
apply such approach using a coalitional analysis to study how diﬀerences in sectoral
composition in the economy aﬀect policy outcomes. In doing so, however, they
implicitly assume that the coalitions both in industrialized and agrarian countries
are formed under a homogeneous political environment. In a similar vein, another
strand of the literature focuses on the diﬀerence in the labor share of agriculture
across developed and developing countries. The argument here follows the group
action logic forwarded by Olson (1971), where large share of agricultural labor is
argued to weaken farmers lobbying ability by worsening the free-riding problem
(Olson, 1986). Impact of increase in population share again is assumed to aﬀect
agricultural policies negatively irrespective of the political regime. My approach in
this paper diverts from this tradition by focusing speciﬁcally on a particular regime
type, namely dictatorship.
The other limitation with the above literature is that it disregards heterogene-
ity among both developing and developed countries, particularly heterogeneity in
political institutions. Among many others, case studies of India (Varshney, 1998),
South Korea (Kruger, 1992) and Costarica (Colburn, 1993) have shown the sig-
niﬁcant variations among developing countries1. This has led to a plethora of both
empirical and theoretical literature regarding the impact of political institutions and
ideology on policy outcomes. The empirical studies focus on estimating the average
impact of changes in democratization, forms of government, voting rules and ideol-
ogy on agricultural policies. Much of this literature however ignores the potential
interaction between economic structure and political institutions. For example, a
change in economic structure may have diﬀerent impact depending on the type of
political institutions, and vice versa. Unlike previously held view about the negative
eﬀect of agriculture labor share on pro-agricultural policies, Bates and Block (2010)
for example show that, for African countries, “the existence of party competition
turns the lobbying disadvantage of the rural majority into political advantage”. By
identifying the mechanisms that link changes in economic structure with political
incentives under dictatorial regimes, this paper thus attempts to provide further in-
sight regarding the interaction between changes in economic structure and political
institutions.
As pointed out by Olper and Raimondi (2010), much of the early empirical lit-
erature has weak link with comparative political economy models. Latter attempts
following Henning et al. (2002) and Olper and Raimondi (2004) largely relied on
some modiﬁcation of the voting models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Using
voting model under imperfect information, Majumdar et al. (2004) for example show
how urban residents may get favorable policy outcomes due to the information ad-
vantage they have compared to their rural counterparts. The voting models provide
useful insights with carefully formulated theoretical arguments. However, their ap-
plication is limited to democratic regimes leaves us with a big gap in our attempt to
understand dictatorial regimes that constitute a large part of the developing world.
By focusing on dictatorial regimes, the model developed in this paper thus attempts
to narrow this gap. Swinnen (2010) provides detail review of the related literature.
1A number of other cases are discussed in articles in Journal of Development Studies, 1993,
29(4). Special Issue: Beyond Urban Bias.
3Finally, this paper broadly relates to the growing class of political economy lit-
erature trying to understand policy making in autocratic regimes. Acemoglu et al.
(2003) and Padro-I-Miquel (2007) show how self-interested leaders maximize their
rent and impose exploitative policies by capitalizing on political fragmentation of
citizens. Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) discuss why some autocracies perform better
than others.
The next section begins with laying down set-up of the model. It will then
be followed by analysis of the equilibrium policy outcomes. Section 4 will take a
look at correlates of agricultural policies and economic structure under diﬀerent
regime types to examine if the model’s major prediction is consistent with patters
in observed policies. The ﬁnal section presents concluding remarks.
2 The model
This section will present a dynamic political economy model to explain anti-agricultural
policies and their relationship with agricultural dominance in the economy. I will
ﬁrst present basic set up of the model in the next section. Then analysis of the
equilibrium outcomes will follow.
2.1 Setup: players, strategies and timing
Consider a dynamic game among various groups within the society. Speciﬁcally,
assume that there are four groups of players: an incumbent leader (denoted by L),
a regime insider (denoted by I), a continuum of urban citizens (denoted by U) and
a continuum of rural citizens (denoted by R).
Political inﬂuence and power rivalry is carried out through non-democratic means.
The leader’s objective is to maximize his rent (taxes collected) from output produced
by citizens. While doing so, however, he faces certain constraints depending on the
relative political strength of each group within the society. The main constraint is
the threat he faces from his insider. Depending on strength of the insider, urban
citizens and rural citizens, assume that there are four possibilities regarding how
the insider can overthrow the leader. In this game, I consider these possibilities as
exogenously given states of the world, and denote by q 2 fqa;qur;qu;qrg. If the state
is qa, the insider can overthrow the leader by himself; if q = qur, the insider can
overthrow the leader with the support of either U or R; if q = qr, the insider can
overthrow the leader only with the support of R; if q = qu, the insider can overthrow
the leader only with the support of U.
If an incumbent leader is overthrown, there is uncertainty regarding each group’s
relative political power in the future. Such uncertainties are typically the case follow-
ing political uprisings in weakly institutionalized states. The uncertainty is captured
by random changes in the state variable q whenever there is change of power (i.e.
leader overthrow). In each period, a total quantity of yu and yr is produced by the
urban and rural sector, respectively. Timing of the game and the strategies by each
group are as follows:
4Step 1 At time t = 0 (the initial period), nature randomly selects the leader and the
insider from the citizens and determines type of the state qt 2 fqa;qu;qr;qurg.
Step 2 All players observe state of the world qt.
Step 3 The leader announces the tax rates on both sectors ′
u;t;′
r;t 2 [0; ¯ ] for some






Step 4 The insider proposes whether to overthrow the leader. If so, whether to do
it alone, with the support of U or with support of R. Denote the insider’s
strategy by  t = ( a;t; u;t; r;t) 2 Ψ 
{
f0;1g  f0;1g  f0;1g
}
.  a = 1
if the insider decided to overthrow by himself; otherwise,  a = 0. Similarly,
 u = 1 ( r = 1) if the insider calls for support of the urban (rural) citizens;
otherwise,  u = 0 ( r = 0).
Step 5 Citizens decide whether to oﬀer support for the insider’s call: zu;t;zr;t 2 f0;1g.
If zs;t = 1 for s 2 fu;rg (i.e. if citizens participate in an overthrow), it
costs them ys for some  > 0. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006),
I assume that participating in a revolution to overthrow an incumbent is a
costly activity.3
Step 6 If leader is not overthrown, qt+1 = qt, u;t = ′
u;t, r;t = ′
r;t and t = ′
t; and the
game continues from Step 2 in period t + 1.
Step 7 If leader is overthrown, u;t = r;t = 0. The leader gets 0 in the future.4
qt+1 takes either of the four values with probabilities pa;pu;pr and pur; in
period t + 1, the game continues from Step 2 with the insider as a leader and
a randomly selected citizen as an insider. This assumption implies that an
insider who kicks out a leader and takes power will face similar rivalry from
his own insider. Leaders change, but the political system/regime remains the
same.












2The assumption that ¯  < 1 is a reduced form for non-political constraints that the leader faces.
One such constraint is what is called the “dead-weight loss” where the actual revenue for the leader
from announcing a tax rate of  will be    
2
2 for some  > 0, see Meltzer and Richard (1981).
The other constraint is what Acemoglu (2005) calls “economic power” of citizens where citizens can
hide their output and evade taxes albeit with certain costs (such as resorting to informal activities
which may give them lower returns) if the taxes are too high.
3The sequence between Step 4 and 5 is not necessary for the conclusion on tax rates. The
equilibrium tax rates will still be the same even if we interchange Step 5 and Step 4








(1   t)(u;tyu + r;tyr); if j is a leader in period t
t(u;tyu + r;tyr); if j is an insider in period t
(1   s;t   zs;t)ys;s 2 fu;rg; if j is an ordinary citizen
2.2 Analysis
The equilibrium concept used is in this analysis is pure strategy Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (henceforth MPE). The appealing feature of MPE is its analytical sim-
plicity. Within each period, players play sub-game perfect equilibrium. And along
the equilibrium path, equilibrium strategies are functions of the state variable q.
The following deﬁnition presents a precise equilibrium concept used in this analysis.
Deﬁnition 1. The MPE of this game is a set of the value functions fVi(q) : i 2
fU;R;I;Lgg; strategy by the leader (u;r;)(q); strategy by citizens zu(q) and zr(q);
and strategy by the current insider  (q) such that:












































In equilibrium, the leader maximizes his rent (1 t)(u;tyu+r;tyr) while appeas-
ing either one or more of the groups U;L and I to secure his survival. Depending
on model parameters, we will see that there are ﬁve cases with unique equilibrium
tax rates in each case. These cases pertain to alternative assumptions about model
parameters.
Case 1:
The ﬁrst case pertains to the following assumption
u1yu + r1yr  ¯ (yu + yr)   E1 (A1)





1   (pu + pur)






1   (pr + pur)






pu(u1yu + ¯ yr) + pr(¯ yu + r1yr) + pur(u1yu + r1yr) + pa¯ (yu + yr)
)
We then have the following proposition about the equilibrium outcome under
assumption A1.
Proposition 1 (MPE1). Given assumption A1, the MPE strategies of this game
are
 u(qu) = u(qur) = u1;u(qr) = u(qa) = ¯ 
 r(qr) = r(qur) = r1;r(qu) = r(qa) = ¯ 
 (qu) = (qr) = (qur) = 0
 (qa) = ∗ such that ∗¯ (yu + yr) = E1
  u(q); r(q);zu(q);zu(q) = 0
Proof. In order to prove MPE1 is indeed an equilibrium, we follow the usual proce-
dure where we ﬁrst conjecture that MPE1 is an MPE and then verify the claim.5
Given the conjecture, note that the expected payoﬀ for the insider from taking
power is E1. If he can, the insider wants to overthrow the leader as long as the
leader’s oﬀer to the insider is less than the discounted value of becoming a leader,
which is E1.
Note also that, when q = qu or q = qur, urban citizens are indiﬀerent between
paying the current tax u and participating in leader’s overthrow (upon the insider’s
call to do so) if
1   u
1   




pu(1   u(qu)) + pur(1   u(qur)) + (pr + po)(1   ¯ )
)
=) 1   u = 1 +        + Γu =) u =  + (1      Γu)
where
Γu = pu(1   u(qu)) + pur(1   u(qur)) + (pr + po)(1   ¯ )
In equilibrium, u = u(q) = u(qur), which implies u = u1. Similarly, when q = qr








pr(1   r(qr)) + pur(1   r(qur)) + (pu + po)(1   ¯ )
)
=) 1   r = 1 +        + Γr =) r =  + (1      Γr)
5See for example, Hassler et al. (2003).
7where
Γr = pr(1   r(qr)) + pur(1   r(qur)) + (pu + po)(1   ¯ )
In equilibrium r = r(q) = r(qur), which implies r = r1.
The leader doesn’t obviously has the incentive to decrease taxes below what is
required to keep the urban and rural residents just indiﬀerent between protesting
or not (i.e. u1 and r1). If the leader increases taxes beyond u1 and r1, he has
to appease the insider as citizens will support the insider’s call for leader change.
However, by assumption A1, increasing taxes to ¯  and sharing the rent with insider is
not optimal for the leader. So the leader proposes u1 and r1 as his optimal strategy.
And knowing that he will not get support of the citizens, the insider doesn’t have
the incentive to call for overthrow of the leader.
Under the above equilibrium (MPE1), instead of instituting the maximum ex-
ploitative tax rate (i.e ¯ ) and buying-oﬀ the regime insider, the leader decides to
appease citizens by oﬀering them lower tax rates (u1;r1  ¯ ) whenever the insider
needs popular support to overthrow the leader (i.e. when the state is either of qu;qr
and qur). This is a rational strategy for the leader because the leader can impose
large enough taxes without instigating citizens for political uprising to overthrow
him.
Both u1 and r1 are increasing in .6 This is so because, as the cost of over-
throwing the leader increases, citizens are less willing to overthrow the leader even
if the leader imposes high taxes. u1 and r1 are also increasing in . This outcome
is driven by the uncertainty following leader changes. The group that has political
power today may lose such power as the state can change in the aftermath of leader
overthrow. The more forward-looking citizens are, the more they worry that fu-
ture political power may slip out of their hand if they overthrow the current leader.
Knowing this, the leader can impose higher and higher taxes as citizens get more
and more forward-looking. u1 is decreasing in pu and pur, and increasing in pr and
pa. The intuition behind this result is that, when pu and pur increase, the probability
that urban residents will remain powerful (i.e the next state will be either pu or pur)
is more likely if the current leader is overthrown.7And as they feel more conﬁdent
that power will remain in their hand, they will thus be less willing to accept higher
taxes. Knowing this, the leader imposes a lower tax rate. Similarly, r1 is decreasing
in pr and pur, and increasing in pu and pa.
Case 2:
The second case pertains to the situation such that the following assumption is
satisﬁed.
u2yu + r2yr < ¯ (yu + yr)   E2
u2yu + ¯ yr; ¯ yu + r2yr  ¯ (yu + yr)   E2
(A2)
6Taking the derivatives, @r1
@pr =
 (  )(1 )
[1 (pr+pur)]2  0, @u1
@pu =
 (  )(1 )
[1 (pu+pur)]2  0, @u1
@ =
1 
[1 (pu+pur)]2  0, @r1
@ =
1 
[1 (pr+pur)]2  0, @r1
@ =
(  )(1 (pr+pur))




7Such fear of losing political power is the main mechanism in what Padro-I-Miquel (2007) calls
“the politics of fear” where leaders capitalize on citizens fear in ethnically divided societies.

















1 + (pa + pur)
(
pu(u2yu + ¯ yr) + pr(¯ yu + r2yr)+
(pa + pur)¯ (yu + yr)
)
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (MPE2). Given assumption A2, the MPE strategies of this game
are
 u(qu) = u2;u(qr) = u(qur) = u(qa) = ¯ 
 r(qr) = r2;r(qur) = r(qu) = r(qa) = ¯ 
 (qu) = (qr) = 0
 (qur) = (qa) = ∗ such that ∗¯ (yu + yr) = E1
  u(q); r(q);zu(q);zu(q) = 0
Proof. As in the proof for MPE1, we ﬁrst conjecture that MPE2 is an MPE and
verify the conjecture. Given the conjecture, the expected payoﬀ for insider from
taking power is E2. If he can, the insider thus wants to overthrow the leader as long
as his oﬀer from the leader is less than E2.
When q = qur, the maximum urban and rural taxes the leader can impose without
protest by the citizens is u2 and r2, respectively. But, by the assumption A2, the
leader is better oﬀ by increasing taxes to ¯  and sharing it with the insider. When
q = qu (or q = qr), the max urban (or rural) tax that urban (rural) citizens are
willing to accept without resorting to protest is u2 (or r2). And, given assumption
A2, setting those taxes is better for the leader than imposing the maximum tax rate
¯  and sharing it with the insider.
The major diﬀerence between MPE2 and MPE1 is that, unlike in MPE1, the
leader resorts to appeasing the insider and imposes the maximum tax rate ¯  when
the state is qur. This is so because, under assumption A2, oﬀering low taxes simul-
taneously to both groups is now less attractive compared to imposing the maximum
tax rate ¯  on both groups and dividing up the rent with the insider.
Some of the results that we ﬁnd in MPE1 also hold under MPE2 and for same
reasons: both r2 and u1 are increasing in , pa and ; u2 is decreasing in pu and
increasing in pr; and r2 is increasing in pr and decreasing in pu. However, unlike in
MPE1, both u2 and r2 are now increasing in pur.
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8Taking the derivatives, @r2
@pr =
 (  )(1 )
(1 pr)2 < 0, @u2
@pu =
 (  )(1 )












Now we consider the 3rd case where the following conditions are satisﬁed.
¯ yu + r3yr < ¯ (yu + yr)   E3
u2yu + ¯ yr  ¯ (yu + yr)   E3
(A3)
where r3 and E3 are deﬁned as follows:
r3  max
{




pu(u2yu + ¯ yr) + (1   pu)¯ (yu + yr)
1 + (1   pu)
Then the following proposition is true.
Proposition 3 (MPE3). Given assumption A3, the MPE strategies of this game
are
 u(qu) = u2;u(qur) = u(qr) = u(qa) = ¯ 
 r(q) = ¯ 
 (qu) = 0
 (qur) = (qa) = (qr) = ∗ such that ∗¯ (yu + yr) = E3
  u(q); r(q);zu(q);zu(q) = 0
Proof. Under MPE3, the expected payoﬀ for insider from taking power is E3. And
if he can, the insider wants to overthrow the leader as long as his oﬀer from the
leader is less than E3. When q = qur, the maximum urban taxes the leader can
impose without facing protest from urban citizens is u2. However, by assumption
A3, the leader is better oﬀ by increasing taxes to ¯  and sharing it with the insider.
When q = qu, the maximum urban (rural) tax is u2 (¯ ). And setting those taxes
is better for the leader than increasing the urban tax further and sharing it with
insider. When q = qr, the max rural tax the leader can impose without facing
protest from rural residents is r3). And increasing the rural tax further and sharing
it with insider is better for the leader than setting those taxes and retaining all the
rent for himself.
Under MPE3, there is a bias against the rural citizens in the sense that the leader
doesn’t ﬁnd it attractive to oﬀer lower tax rate to the rural citizens when the state
is qr whereas he oﬀers a lower tax rate to the urban citizens (i.e u2  ¯ ) when the
state is qu.
10Case 4:
A symmetric MPE holds if we consider what can be viewed as an opposite of as-
sumption A3. Assume that
u3yu + ¯ yr < ¯ (yu + yr)   E4
¯ yu + r2yr  ¯ (yu + yr)   E4
(A4)
where u3 and E4 are deﬁned as follows:
u3  max
{
¯ ; + (¯    )
}
E4 
pr(¯ yu + r2yr) + (1   pr)¯ (yu + yr)
1 + (1   pr)
Then the following proposition is true.
Proposition 4 (MPE4). Given assumption A4, the MPE strategies of this game
are
 u(q) = ¯ 
 r(qr) = r2;r(qur) = r(qr) = r(qa) = ¯ 
 (qr) = 0
 (qur) = (qa) = (qr) = ∗ such that ∗¯ (yu + yr) = E3
  u(q); r(q);zu(q);zu(q) = 0
Proof. Follow similar steps as in the proof for MPE3 while replacing E3, u2 and pu
with E4,r2 and pr.
Under MPE4, the bias is against the urban sector. The leader imposes a lower
tax rate (i.e. r2  ¯ ) on the rural citizens when the state is qr while imposing the
maximum tax rate ¯  on the urban residents when the state is qu.
Case 5:
Finally, assume that
u3yu + ¯ yr; ¯ yu + r3yr < E5 (A5)
where E5  ¯ (yu + yr)=(1 + ). Then the following proposition is true.
Proposition 5 (MPE5). Given assumption A5, the MPE strategies of this game
are




  u(q); r(q);zu(q);zu(q) = 0
11Under MPE5, irrespective of the state, the leader always prefers imposing the
maximum tax rate on both urban and rural citizens and share it with the insider.
The ﬁve equilibria listed under propositions 1 to 5 exhaust all the possible MPEs.
In order to conﬁrm this, note that the leader needs to appease at least one of the
groups U, R or I. And depending on model parameters and state of the world, the
leader appeases the group in such a way that he maximizes his rent while ensuring
his survival. For example, when the state is qu, the leader compares his payoﬀ from
appeasing the urban residents (by oﬀering them a tax rate lower than ¯ ) with that
of buying in the insider while imposing the maximum tax rate. Under MPE1, MPE2
and MPE3, the leader opts for the ﬁrst option while he chooses the second option
under MPE4 and MPE5. When the state is qr, the leader relies on the support of
rural citizens under MPE1, MPE2 and MP4 while he chooses to buy oﬀ the insider
and impose ¯  on the rural citizens under MPE3 and MPE5. When the state is qur,
the leader appeases both urban and rural residents under MPE1 while it resorts to
buying the insider and imposing the maximum tax rates on both groups under the
other four equilibria. In all of the cases, the leader appeases the insider and imposes
¯  if the state is qa.
3 Urban bias, political power and dominance of
agriculture
In this section, we will take a closer look at the interaction between policy outcomes
and economic structure as measured by relative size of the two sectors. As we have
seen from equilibrium analysis in the previous section, policy outcomes depend on
which of the ﬁve cases prevail and, for a given case, which state of the world we
are in. For example, the probability distribution aﬀects not only the likelihood of
each state within a given case, but it also aﬀects which of the ﬁve cases will be
realized. Depending on the state we are in, the probability distribution also aﬀects
the equilibrium tax rates. In order to conceptualize urban bias in the framework
of this model and derive testable prediction, we thus need to have a comprehensive
measure accounting for all of these factors. Lets hence consider expected tax rates
on both sectors, denoted by Eu(qu) and Eu(qr), as such a measure where
Eu = puu(qu) + pru(qr) + puru(qur) + pau(qa) (2)
Er = pur(qu) + prr(qr) + purr(qur) + par(qa) (3)
Eu and Er can be interpreted as the expected tax rates in a randomly picked
country characterized by the model parameters. Since u(q) and r(q) are equilibrium
tax rates, Eu(qu) and Eu(qr) take into account the impacts of changes in model
parameters (such as political power distribution and relative size of each sector) on
the likelihood of each state, which of the ﬁve cases we will be in, and the tax rates
within each case.
Increase in pu decreases Eu under either of the assumptions A1, A2 and A3.
This is so for two reasons. Firstly, in each of the the three cases, u(qu) decreases as
pu increases. And Eu decreases since u(qu) enters additively in the expression for
u(qu). Secondly, under assumptions A1, A2 and A3, u(qu)  u(qr);u(qur);u(qa).
12Increase in pu decreases Eu since higher pu means larger weight for the smaller term
in the expression for Eu and lower weight for the larger terms. Under assumption
A1, increases in pu and pur have the same eﬀect on Eu. Under assumptions A4 and
A5, both pu and pur have no eﬀect on Eu.
Similarly, increases in pr under assumptions A1, A2 and A4 decrease Er. Under
assumption A1, increases in pr and pur have the same eﬀect on Er. Under assump-
tions A3 and A5, both pr and pur have no eﬀect on Er. The following proposition
summarizes these eﬀects.
Proposition 6. Eu is decreasing in pu if either of assumptions A1, A2 and A3
hold. It is decreasing in pur if A1 holds. Similarly, Er is decreasing in pr if either
of assumptions A1, A2 and A4 hold. It is decreasing in pur if A1 holds.
Proof. See the appendix.
The increase in agriculture’s relative size yr=yu can have a positive eﬀect on Er.
This happens because, as share of the rural sector increases, a shift from either of the
three equilibria MPE1, MPE2 and MPE4 to MPE3 may occur. Such bias against
agriculture can occur despite the relative political power of the rural citizens.
The main intuition behind this result is that, when the relative size of agriculture
increases, appeasing the rural population may require giving up a large amount of
rent. As the agriculture’s relative size increases, the equilibrium may move to MPE3
which features bias against agriculture. This bias is despite the absence of diﬀerence
in political power between the rural and the urban citizens (as measured by pu
and pr). Consider the relative expected tax rates Er=Eu as a measure of bias
against agriculture. There is no bias if Er=Eu = 1, the bias is against agriculture
if Er=Eu > 1, and the bias is against the urban sector if Er=Eu < 1. We thus
have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume pu = pr = p∗ > 0, i.e. there is no bias in political power.
For large enough yr=yu, Er=Eu  1. And if (1   )(¯    ) > ¯ =[1 + (1   p∗)],
then Er=Eu > 1 for large enough yr=yu. Conversely, for small enough yr=yu,
Er=Eu  1. And if (1   )(¯    ) > ¯ =[1 + (1   p∗)], then Er=Eu < 1 for
small enough yr=yu.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Empirical evidence
This section takes a look at the statistical correlates regarding the association be-
tween the dominance of agriculture in the national economy and anti-agricultural
policies given by Proposition 7. I will ﬁrst discuss the main variables in the analysis
and data source. We will then proceed to regression analysis.
Rates of Assistance
The two key variables in this analysis are the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and
relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture. Estimates for NRA and RRA are
13done and compiled by a team of researchers under auspices of the World Bank. The
data source is Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).
NRAs measure the subsidies (or taxations) that the agricultural sector receives
(or pays) as a result of mainly government-imposed measures. Details of the mea-
surement steps are described in Anderson et al. (2008). For each country in the
sample, NRAs are estimated for a variety of agricultural commodities. Then a
weighted average of NRAs for each commodity is taken to estimate overall NRA
to the agricultural sector in the country. The nominal rate of assistance that a





where Di denotes the actual return that a producer of agricultural product i receives
while Ri denotes the return that would have prevailed under a free market condi-
tion. Agricultural commodity i is said to have subsidized (or taxed) if NRAi > 0
(or NRAi < 0). The subsidies/taxes take various forms such as tariﬀs on competing
imported items, export subsidies/taxes, direct production subsidies/taxes to farm-
ers, exchange rate manipulations to impose subsidy/tax on imports and exports,
and subsidies/taxes to inputs for production. The overall NRA that the agricul-






where i is the ratio of the commodity i’s value to value of the country’s total
agricultural produce. So i measures the relative economic importance of commodity
i in the country’s agricultural sector. For each country included in the sample, annual
time series of NRAs are estimated spanning from year 1955 to 2007. For some
countries, the time series may not cover the entire period of 1955-2007. Included in
the estimation are a total of 75 countries. According to Anderson and Valenzuela
(2008), the countries together account for 92 percent of the world’s population and
agricultural GDP and 95 percent of total GDP. They also account for more than 85
percent of farm production and employment in each of Africa, Asia, Latin America
and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia. NRAs are estimated for
more than 70 diﬀerent products, with an average of 11 per country. In aggregate the
coverage represents around 70 percent of the gross value of agricultural production
in the focus countries, and just under two-thirds of global farm production.
RRA on the other hand measures net assistances oﬀered to agriculture relative





where NRAnonagri measures the nominal rate of assistance oﬀered to non-agricultural
sectors.
14Other variables
As a measure of the relative importance (or extent of dominance) of agriculture
in the national economy, the ratio of value-added by the agricultural sector to the
nation’s total value-added is used. The correlation between share of agriculture’s
value-added in the national economy and the NRA will be used to study the statis-
tical relationship between agricultural dominance and anti-agricultural policy. At
early level of development, ideological justiﬁcations have apparently been presented
to justify resource extraction from the agricultural sector in order to ﬁnance state-
led industrialization. Share of value-added by the manufacturing sector in the na-
tional economy is thus used to measure the impact of early industrialization on
NRAs. Other variables included in the statistical analysis are ratio of agricultural
to non-agricultural population and income from mineral and energy extraction. The
agricultural population ratio is included to account for potential political impact
of population size. Mineral and energy abundances are included to control for the
potential impact of mineral and energy resource abundance on the overall economic
institutions and agricultural policy. The data source for these variables is World
Development Indicators 2010.
A measure of political freedom is used to study biases against/for agriculture
across political regimes. The political measure is a categorical variable that assigns
three values for each country during each year. Depending on the extent of political
freedom that citizens have in a country, the country can be ranked as free, partially
free or not free. This variable is used to distinguish between democracies and non-
democracies. The data source is Freedom in the World 2010.
Estimation Results
Tables 1 to 4 present ﬁxed-eﬀect panel regression estimates to investigate the re-
lationship between output share of agriculture in the national economy (deﬁned as
the ratio of value added by agriculture to the total value added in the economy) and
rate of assistances. An advantage of the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimate is that it controls for
time-invariant factors such as geography and historical legacies. As the mechanisms
outlined in the model pertain to non-democratic regimes, separate regressions based
on political status are reported. In tables 1 and 2, the dependent variable is NRA
while we have RRA as the dependent variable in tables 3 and 4.
In Table 1, we have regression estimates for regimes that are relatively non-
democratic (labeled as Not Free or Partially Free in the Freedom House category).
The ﬁrst column (A) includes agriculture’s share of value added as the only right-
hand-side variable. The estimated coeﬃcient is negative. As the output share of
agriculture in the economy increases, countries tend to tax the agricultural sector
more, which is consistent with Proposition 7. A unit increase in the share of agri-
culture decreases the NRA by almost a proportionate amount (0.92).
Abundance of natural resources such as minerals and energy may inﬂuence tax
policies toward agriculture (Bates and Block, 2010). Resource abundance may also
inﬂuence institutional quality (Sachs and Warner, 1995). The variables Energy Rich
and Mineral Rich are dummy indicators to show whether a country is major producer
of energy and mineral resources, respectively. The mineral are bauxite, copper, iron,
15Table 1: Share of agriculture and NRA in non-democracies
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Agri. value added (ratio) -0.92*** -0.93*** -0.70** -0.74** -0.95***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.35) (0.34)
Energy Rich -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Mineral Rich -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ratio of agri. to non-agri. pop. -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Manuf. value added (ratio) 1.51 0.80
(1.23) (1.13)
Manuf. value added (ratio)-square -5.46** -4.09*
(2.44) (2.28)
Energy Extraction(% of GDP) -0.00
(0.00)
Mineral Extraction (% of GDP) -0.01***
(0.00)
Constant 0.15** 0.18** 0.24** 0.17 0.21
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19) (0.17)
Observations 953 953 789 789 721
Countries 44 44 38 38 36
R-Square 0.073 0.077 0.125 0.159 0.194
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
16lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold and silver. The variable Mineral Rich assumes
value 1 if share of value of mineral extracted in the country’s GDP is higher than
the median share in the sample observations. Similar categorization for abundance
of energy resources is done with the variable Energy Rich. The energy resources
included are crude oil, natural gas and coal.
Column (B) shows that the coeﬃcient on share of agriculture remains signiﬁ-
cantly negative. Column (C) controls for the ratio of population employed in the
agriculture to the population employed in non-agricultural. The relative size of the
agricultural population is argued to have a negative eﬀect on assistance to agricul-
ture by reducing the lobbying incentive of farmers (Olson, 1986; Anderson, 1995).
The estimated coeﬃcient on agriculture’s relative population share has the expected
sign. The coeﬃcient on share of agriculture is still signiﬁcantly negative.
Table 2: Share of agriculture and NRA
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Agri. value added (ratio) 0.53 0.62 0.10 0.02 -0.29
(0.69) (0.72) (0.59) (0.54) (0.63)
Energy Rich 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Mineral Rich -0.05 -0.02 -0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Ratio of agri. to non-agri. pop. -0.30** -0.27 -0.19
(0.12) (0.20) (0.25)
Manuf. value added (ratio) 13.02** 13.35**
(5.05) (5.08)
Manuf. value added (ratio)-square -30.32*** -30.85***
(10.58) (10.64)
Energy Extraction(% of GDP) -0.02
(0.03)
Mineral Extraction (% of GDP) -0.05**
(0.02)
Constant 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.55*** -0.78 -0.78
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.58) (0.55)
Observations 998 998 848 848 845
Countries 50 50 45 45 44
R-Square 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.074 0.086
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Low level of industrialization and governments ambition to develop their man-
ufacturing sector through resource transfer from the agricultural sector often men-
tioned as a reason for anti-agricultural policies in many developing countries (see
17e.g. Schiﬀ and Valds, 2002; Krueger, 1996). To control for such eﬀect, column (D)
includes the value added share of the manufacturing sector in the country’s total
value added. Due to the potential non-linearity of this eﬀect, partly because of the
non-linear share of manufacturing sector in the stage of economic transformation,
the square term is also included. The estimated coeﬃcients show that taxes on
agriculture decrease, albeit at a decreasing rate, with increase in output share of
the manufacturing sector. Column (E) includes a more direct measure of resource
abundance - share of the value of energy and mineral extraction in the GDP. Both
in column (D) and (E), the relationship between share of agriculture in the national
value added remains to have a signiﬁcant negative relationship with NRA.
Table 3: Share of agriculture and RRA in non-democracies
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Agri. value added (ratio) -1.61*** -1.61*** -1.00*** -1.00** -1.20***
(0.31) (0.33) (0.34) (0.42) (0.42)
Energy Rich -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Mineral Rich -0.06 -0.04 -0.05*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Ratio of agri. to non-agri. pop. -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Manuf. value added (ratio) 2.04 1.15
(1.30) (1.25)
Manuf. value added (ratio)-square -6.63** -5.07*
(2.70) (2.60)
Energy Extraction(% of GDP) -0.01*
(0.00)
Mineral Extraction (% of GDP) -0.01***
(0.00)
Constant 0.16** 0.23** 0.27** 0.15 0.22
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.21) (0.19)
Observations 798 798 780 780 713
Countries 36 36 35 35 33
R-Square 0.163 0.174 0.210 0.246 0.284
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Similar regression exercise is done for democratic countries (categorized as Free
by the Freedom House). Table 2 presents estimation results for those countries.
Columns (A) - (E) show the estimated coeﬃcients with alternative control variables.
In all cases, the partial correlation between NRA and agriculture’s value added share
18is statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding suggests that the relationship between
output share of agricultural and anti-agricultural policies is primarily a feature of
non-democratic regimes.
Table 4: Share of agriculture and RRA in democracies
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Agri. value added (ratio) -0.14 0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.58
(0.80) (0.87) (0.70) (0.51) (0.57)
Energy Rich 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Mineral Rich -0.10** -0.07 -0.08*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Ratio of agri. to non-agri. pop. -0.46** -0.42** -0.35
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
Manuf. value added (ratio) 9.66*** 9.58***
(3.03) (2.83)
Manuf. value added (ratio)-square -23.48*** -23.27***
(6.59) (6.44)
Energy Extraction(% of GDP) -0.02
(0.02)
Mineral Extraction (% of GDP) -0.04*
(0.02)
Constant 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.57*** -0.38 -0.35
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.33) (0.30)
Observations 933 933 815 815 812
Countries 47 47 45 45 44
R-Square 0.000 0.009 0.038 0.091 0.095
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Finally, Table 3 and 4 report estimation results with RRA as the dependent
variable. Compared to NRA, RRA can be considered as a closer proxy for Er=Eu
in Proposition 7 since it measures the relative transfers to the agricultural sector.
The results conﬁrm the negative relationship between share of agricultural output
and tax rates in non-democracies whereas there is no signiﬁcant relationship in
democracies.
5 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to provide both theoretical and empirical contributions
to better understand what is considered to be one of the most important policy
19constraint to poverty reduction, namely governments bias against their rural citi-
zens who constitute large share of the poor. A formal political economy model is
developed to explain urban bias. Unlike previous models of anti-agricultural policies
that largely relied on some extension of voting models, the focus in this model is on
dictatorial regimes. Equilibrium outcomes relating policy outcomes with economic
structure, political power, and other behavioral and structural variables are ana-
lyzed. By identifying the mechanisms that link changes in economic structure with
political incentives under dictatorial regimes, this paper thus attempts to provide
further insight regarding the interaction between changes in economic structure and
political institutions. The empirical evidence shows that diﬀerent regime types re-
spond diﬀerently to changes in economic structure. The reaction by non-democratic
regimes to changes in output share of agriculture is consistent with the model’s
prediction.
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22Appendix
A. Proof of Prposition 6
We take the derivatives of Eu with respect to the probabilities and see if they are
negative or positive.




= u(qu) + pu
@u(qu)
@pu







  u(qa) + pa
@u(qa)
@pa
Under assumption A1, u(qu) = u(qur) = u1, u(qa) = u(qr) = ¯ . Thus
dEu
dpu
= u1 + pu
@u1
@pu
  ¯  + pr  0   u1 + pur
@u(qur)
@pur
  ¯  + pa  0
Since @u1=@pu = @u1=@pur  0,
dEu
dpu
= (pu + pur)
@u1
@pu
  2¯   0:
And since dEu=dpu = dEu=dpur under assumption A1, Eu is also decreasing in
pur.
Under assumption A2, u(qu) = u2 and u(qur) = u(qa) = u(qr) = ¯ . Thus
dEu
dpu
= u2 + pu
@u2
@pu
  ¯  + pr  0   ¯  + pur  0   ¯  + pa  0:
Since u2=@pu  0,
dEu
dpu
= u2 + pu
@u2
@pu
  3¯   0:
dEu=dpu is also decreasing under assumption A3 since it has the same value as in
the case with assumption A2.
Similar steps can be followed to prove that Er is decreasing in pr if either of
assumptions A1, A2 and A4 hold, and that it is decreasing in pur if A1 holds.
B. Proof of Prposition 7
We prove this propostion that given the condition (1 )( ) > =[1+(1 pu)] is
satisﬁed, for large enough yr=yu, assumption A3 is satisﬁed. Let  = yr=yu. Dividing
both sides of the second inequality in A3 by yu, we get
u2 + ¯   ¯ (1 + )   
E3
yu


















=    
1+(1−pu) (8)
23The derivative given by (8) is a negative constant. Hence, the RHS of (7) is a linear
function of . And since the slope is negative, for large enough , the inequality (7)
is satisﬁed (hence second inequality of assumption A3 is satisﬁed).
Now lets derive similar condition for the ﬁrst inequality in assumption A3. Divide
both sides of the inequality by yu to get
¯  + r3 < ¯ (1 + )   
E3
yu


















= ¯    r3   
¯ 
1 + (1   pu)
(10)








= (1   )(¯    )  
¯ 
1 + (1   pu)
Again the RHS of inequality (9) is a linear function of . And if (1   )(  
) > =[1 + (1   pu)], the coeﬃcient on  is negative. Hence, for large enough
, inequality (9) is satisﬁed (hence the ﬁrst inequality in assumption A3 is also
satisﬁed).
Similar steps can be followed to prove that for small enough yr=yu, Er=Eu  1.
24